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Ford 9/14/06 6/23 describe a Socratic encounter, "conversation" connoted a casual and leisurely discussion, conducted among those who were, if not precise social equals, equally free to pass their time this way. The sophists had already put a number of such terms into circulation to avoid undesirable suggestions of inequality in the teacher-pupil terminology. Sophists in
Plato and Xenophon describe their services euphemistically as "associating" or "spending time together" (suneinai, diatribein) with their students, and indeed of "talking together" (homilein, dialegesthai). 9 A young man who was of the age (and economic class) to attend a sophist would have rather been spoken of as one of that wise man's "companions" or "associates" (hetairoi, sunontes) than as his "pupil" (mathêtês).
10
Socratics, then, But Socratic "conversations" had this crucial difference: no fees were attached. The Socratics insulted sophists as at once elitist, in picking and choosing those with whom they would condescend to speak, and as slavish, in selling such a thing as intercourse to the highest bidder (e.g. Xen. Mem. 1.2.7). 11 Socrates, by contrast, was a "popular" sort (dêmotikos, 1.2.60-61) who would talk with anyone for free.
"Conversation" is thus usually the best way to render dialogos in Plato, which seems to refer to a less formal interchange than, e.g. dialogismos, a "counting up." The word could be given a "dialectical" coloring by Socratics. Semantically, it derives from the middle meaning of dialegesthai, but a connection could be asserted with the active dialegein, "to sort into classes." The Xenophontic Socrates does so on one occasion to explain why so much of his conversation was involved with definition. The passage 9 Very revealing is Protagoras' opposition between his own tuition and the "compulsory" education of grammar school (Prot. 326a, cf. 318d-e = 80 A 5 DK). 10 More on this apparently in K. 12 is a pendant to a defense of self-control, which counts among its benefits the ability to analyze things into their natural kinds (kata genê), "sorting them out" (dialegein) into the good and bad so as to choose appropriately. This ability is not, however, purely analytic: it makes men "not only extremely happy but also outstandingly good conversationalists" (διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους). The connection is cemented with a Socratic etymology deriving dialegesthai, "conversing," "from people coming together to deliberate about how to divide things (dialegein) into their natural kinds."
Here then, dialogue comes close to dialectic, but without losing its connection to conversation as a non-technical, non-disciplinary, social activity. Xenophon's down-toearth Socrates is not insensitive to the social advantages that philosophic training can bring: assiduously pursued, this activity produces men who are "the best, the most influential and the most skilled in discussion" (ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους).
Plato's dialogos: an art of conversation
Dialogos is never used by Plato as a name for his genre. There is no passage in his corpus where dialogos or dialegesthai needs to mean anything more formal or technical than conversation among friends. A few times a stretch of argument is called a "dialogue" (e.g. Laches 200e, cf. Rep. 354b), but with no noticeable generic force. Plato takes the heart of verb dialegesthai to be "discuss" when he concocts an etymologizing 12 4.5.11-12: ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι.
[12] καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους· ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἑαυτὸν ἕτοιμον παρασκευάζειν καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους. Cf. Mem. 4.6.1: Ὡς δὲ καὶ διαλεκτικωτέρους ἐποίει τοὺς συνόντας, πειράσομαι καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν. Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι. definition of dia-noia ("thought"): a thought is defined as a kind of logos, specifically a "conversation" in the soul without audible sound (phônê, Sophist 263e, cf. 264a).
13
Two passages in the dialogues have been taken as programmatic for the genre.
The most self-referential occurs in the frame to Theaetetus (143b-c, cf. Cic. Tusc. disp.
1.4.8) in which Euclides the narrator explains how he has composed the book at hand (τὸ βιβλίον τουτί). He has written it down not as it was "narrated" (διηγεῖτο) to him by
Socrates, but as a "conversation" (διαλεγόμενον), dropping the tiresome "narrative parts between the speeches" (αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις), things like "I said" or "he replied." This entire framing prologue has fascinating implications for Plato's readership, 14 but it strikes me as rather ad hoc and I would not infer from it any general theory of dialogic writing.
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Another seemingly relevant passage is Protagoras 338a in which Socrates is said to insist on a "form of conversing" (εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων) that proceeds by short question and answer, one way of describing dialogue. But in context, this "short talk"
(brakhulogia) is simply one mode of conversing among others; it is a mode Socrates undoubtedly prefers, and one that may be pointedly opposed to long sophistical 13 Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν· πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια. Cf. µοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυµός Il.11.407. 14 Harold Tarrant, "Chronology and narrative apparatus in Plato's dialogue," Electronic Antiquity (1994) (http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/ElAnt/V1N8/tarrant.html) has inferred from this passage that the pure dramatic dialogue (with no narrative frame) was not previously familiar to Plato's readership, and this passage announces what is Plato's own modification of the genre. On Tarrant's view, the narrative dialogues of the early-middle period (i.e. Charmides, Erastae (if genuine), Euthydemus, Lysis, Parmenides (to 137), Phaedo, Protagoras, Republic, and Symposium) were written to be published, while the purely dramatic ones, without explanatory frames, were at first confined to private readings in the school. 15 One Platonic discussion of dramatic dialogue seems applicable to his texts: in the famous "tripod of the Muses" passage (Laws 719c) the poet is out of his wits and, "since his art is representation [i.e. it requires characters] he will necessarily produce differing sorts who will say things contradicting one another, without knowing which one is speaking the truth" (καὶ τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως ἀναγκάζεται, ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοις ἀνθρώπους ποιῶν διατιθεμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὑτῷ πολλάκις, οἶδεν δὲ οὔτ' εἰ ταῦτα οὔτ' εἰ θάτερα ἀληθῆ τῶν λεγομένων).
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Tetralogies. 25 To move beyond "conversation" in the direction of a conception of "dialogue" as a literary form we shall have to turn from Plato and the Socratics to Aristotle, and turn as well from dialogoi to Sokratikoi logoi.
The logoi in Socratic logoi
The final step in this study may be described as asking just what the logoi signifies in Sôkratikoi logoi. Obviously the word is polyvalent and in most passages is sufficiently underdetermined to refer to Socratic "discourse" "argument" or "conversation." In addition, the logoi in the phrase could sometimes designate the genre as a form of "prose" as opposed to poetry. Nor can one exclude the concrete sense of "a body of writings" (as in mathêmatikoi logoi), for the need to name a genre becomes acuter the more a growing body of texts makes that genre noticeable to the culture. My purpose in this rather brisk section, however, is not to give one answer to the question as rejection of "display pieces designed to win competitions" (1.22) in favor of the "possession for all time" that he had "written" (1.1). It is well to recall that Thucydides could have been writing not much earlier than our first Socratics.
In fact, the period from 420-320 was one unparalleled in the production of written prose texts on or concerting the topic of making speeches. Gagarin describes Antiphon as
helping to "open the way for the public performance of oratory to replace drama as the rhetoric, whom they agree in calling "sophists," were producing texts on such topics as the virtues of salt or encomia of figures from myth. It is also clear that such literature had a passionate following among the young, and the controversies surrounding it can be seen in that trio of speeches condemning the "written speeches" of "sophists" by Alcidamas, Isocrates, and Plato. 31 As great as was the popularity of this literature, so was the dispproval to which it exposed its authors. 32 In Parmenides Plato represents Zeno as half apologizing for his book of eristic paradoxes as the fruit of a youthful love of contentiousness that was published surreptitiously without his consent (Parm. 128). 33 Ambitious prose authors of Plato's day were stimulated to present their texts as something quite different from what some spurned as "sophistic" practice speeches. They were moved to innovate prose forms in order to proffer what they insisted was a valuable logos but which was decidedly not a rhetorical tekhnê, just as they were something other than "sophists." Isocrates affords an example. His persona is the paradoxical one of a self-declared "weak-voiced" orator; he composes speeches he can't deliver, and yet these logoi ("speeches," here used for non- his Evagoras, even foregoing the advantages of poetry, would make his subject "alwaysremembered" (ée€µnhston, Evag. § 4) as poets long had promised.
53
These heroic wars on poetry were actually dressed battles among prose genres for prestige: this emerges from a passage in which Isocrates gives us his own diaeresis of 49 DL 3.37 (= Fr. 73 Rose): "the form of Plato's writings half way between poetry and prose" φησὶ δ' <Ἀριστοτέλης> τὴν τῶν λόγων ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ (Πλάτωνος) µεταξὺ ποιήµατος εἶναι καὶ πεζοῦ λόγου.) See Else (1957) 42-3, rightly arguing that this passage has nothing to do with the mimetic status of Platonic dialogues. For a collection of ancient attestations to Plato's "poetic" qualities, see Gudeman on 1447b11. 50 Evag. 11: ἢν γάρ τις τῶν ποιηµάτων τῶν εὐδοκιµούντων τὰ µὲν ὀνόµατα καὶ τὰς διανοίας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ µέτρον διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεέστερα τῆς δόξης ἧς νῦν ἔχοµεν περὶ αὐτῶν. Ὅµως δὲ καίπερ τοσοῦτον πλεονεκτούσης τῆς ποιήσεως, οὐκ ὀκνητέον, ἀλλ' ἀπο-πειρατέον τῶν λόγων ἐστὶν, εἰ καὶ τοῦτο δυνήσονται, τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας εὐλογεῖν µηδὲν χεῖρον τῶν ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς µέτροις ἐγκωµιαζόντων. and heard words which they told us to repeat to Lysias and anyone else who composed speeches, and to Homer or any other who has composed poetry with or without musical accompaniment, and third to Solon and whoever has written political compositions which he calls laws: If he has composed his writings with knowledge of the truth, and is able to support them by discussion of that which he has written, and has the power to show by his own speech that the written words are of little worth, such a man ought not 278d] to derive his title from such writings, but from the serious pursuit which underlies them. writers who write with proper understanding, they can call themselves "philosophers"
and drop whatever title (ἐπωνυμίαν, 278c7) they may have from their writings. But if, on the other hand, they are merely good at cutting and pasting, they can keep the (now degraded) titles of poet, prose-writer, or law-writer (ποιητὴν ἢ λόγων συγγραφέα ἢ νομογράφον, 278e). Plato's attempt to re-name writers by the knowledge with which they write rather than on the basis of the form their writings take is very close to Aristotle's attempt to defy current terminology to re-define poetry as kinds of mimesis.
There is a great deal in a name, even an ill-fitting generic term. 65 Cf. Ari. Pol. 1339b31: τὴν δὲ µουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαµεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ µετὰ µελῳδίας. 66 It cannot be that Plato is thinking broadly of constitutional literature, for he is clear that the writings in question are called "laws." One may compare, perhaps, the Nomos by Theodectes: Rhet. 1398b5, 1399b1 or some text of Protagoras' Thurii laws, but Malcolm Schofield suggests to me Plato has in mind that category of text that he will contribute to later with his own Nomoi. 67 For the association of lawmaking as a sort of law-writing, Phaedrus 257e; cf. 258c where one with the power of a Lycurgus or a Solon is said to be an "immortal logographos" Isocrates Antid. 79-83 compares his own logoi to laws. Aristotle go at these terms to show that the nature of prose writing is ill understood in their time, as is its relation to poetry.
Prose dialogues first appeared in Greece among Socrates' followers not long after his death, and he surely inspired their composers. But the new form also had to make sense in its own time, and interest a public with its own ideas about the various literary forms and their various functions. More particularly, a good part of the public, and especially the young had become avid consumers of rhetorical speeches, and in sheer numbers probably the majority of new prose texts that were produced were logoi, speeches, of one sort or another. While many of these speeches were composed by writers who found it desirable to adopt personae that were unserious or ironic, some writers sought to use speech (logoi) to engage the mind of the city more directly; they were "political" writers in the broad sense that encompassed ethics and encomium as well as lawmaking. Among these writers, the Socratics found that conversations (logoi) offered opportunities to address the issues they wanted while avoiding offensive personas. 68 Socrates, of course, can still be given credit in the larger sense that, as he brought philosophy down from the heavens to the agora, he made some of his associates passionate about writing and reading on topics in ethics and social relations that had not been recorded in prose before. But that was just to pose the problem to which dialogue emerged as the answer. Without going further into the ways that different Socratics used the form to produce different personas, I think it fair to say that Socratic dialogue should be regarded more as a product of fourth-century experiments in written prose than as some organic outgrowth of the dead Classical Civilization of the fifth century. In tracking 68 Nightingale raises the question of the author's status in dialogue: 165
